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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ALEX MONTIEL, 
Defendant/Petitioner, 
Case No. 20030310-CA 
Case No. 20040780-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted defendant's petition for writ of certiorari on October 27, 2004. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Utah, a trial court has discretion to reject a plea agreement. In this case, 
the trial court initially stated that it would not accept the plea agreement 
because it does not waive firearm enhancements. However, before rejecting 
the plea agreement, the court also considered the facts of the crime, the 
sentence required under the agreement, and the fact that the victim had not 
been consulted regarding the agreement. 
Where the trial court clearly had multiple grounds for rejecting the plea 
agreement, did the court of appeals properly reject defendant's claim 
challenging only one of those grounds? 
"On certiorari, [this Court] review[s] the decision of the court of appeals and not 
that of the district court." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, If 11, 103 P.3d 699. "[This Court] 
conduces] that review for correctness." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 11, of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is attached at Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 18, 2002, defendant was charged by amended information with one 
count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
302 (Supp. 2001) (R. 135-136). The information alleged that, in the course of committing 
a robbery, defendant "used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun 
and/or caused serious bodily injury" (R. 135). The probable cause statement included in 
the information alleged that, in the course of a robbery, "defendant produced a gun and 
held it to [the victim's] head" (R. 136). 
The amended information also included notice of an enhanced penalty because the 
offense was committed in concert with two or more persons (R. 1350. 
Before trial, the trial court rejected a plea agreement in which the prosecutor and 
defendant agreed to amend the information to charge a third degree felony (R. 200:4-7). 
After a three-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged and specially found that 
defendant had used a gun during the commission of his crime (R. 165-166; R. 203:29-31). 
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than ten years in the Utah 
State Prison (R. 172-173). Defendant timely appealed (R. 181-182). 
On appeal, defendant claimed that the trial court improperly rejected the plea 
agreement "based solely on its personal policy to never waive firearms enhancements." 
Aplt. Br. at 23. According to defendant, the trial court's rejection of the plea agreement 
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was "based not on the proper exercise of its judicial discretion but on the arbitrary 
exercise of its personal bias toward defendants who are charged with using a firearm." 
Aplt. Br. at 26. 
In response, the State argued, inter alia, that in fact the trial court had not relied 
solely upon a personal policy not to waive firearms enhancements, but rather, had also 
considered the circumstances of the alleged crime, the greatly reduced sentence under the 
agreement, and the fact that the victim had not been consulted about the agreement. See 
Aple. Br. at 14. The State asserted that defendant's appeal failed because he challenged 
none of the other legitimate bases of the trial court's ruling. See Aple. Br. at 13-15. 
On July 15, 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a unanimous published decision 
rejecting defendant's claim. See State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, 95 P.3d 1216 
(attached at Addendum A). The court held: 
Although not crystal clear, the record in this case is sufficient to 
support the State's argument that the trial court rejected the plea agreement, 
not only because the underlying charge involved the use of a firearm, but 
also because the court was concerned that Defendant would receive too 
lenient a sentence under the terms of the agreement and because the victim 
had not been informed of the agreement. 
Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, f^ 17. The court of appeals concluded: 
Because we have determined that these grounds are legitimate reasons for 
rejecting the plea agreement, we decline to further consider Defendant's 
challenge to the trial court's rejection of the plea agreement. Specifically, 
we do not address whether the trial court's stated policy regarding charges 
involving use of a firearm, alone, would constitute an abuse of discretion in 
rejecting the plea agreement. 
Id. atf 21. 
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Defendant petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted on October 
27, 2004. See Order dated October 27, 2004. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The crime. Sometime after 10:30 p.m. on January 26, 2002, defendant robbed 
Eric Contreras at gunpoint while a group of defendant's friends helped him (R. 202:16, 
17,34,53-55,94). 
That night, Contreras was with his friend, Edwin Rivas. R. 202:12, 49. While 
driving through the parking lot of the Excalibur dance club, Contreras saw another friend, 
Sandra Palacios, who asked for a ride to Sandra Cortez's house (R. 202:12, 13-14, 27, 
51). 
Upon arriving at Cortez's house, Palacios and Contreras got out of the car and 
were talking (R. 202: 52). Then, a blue Ford Thunderbird pulled up behind Rivas's car, 
and five or six Latino males, including defendant, got out (R. 202: 26, 52-53). 
Palacios, who was defendant's girlfriend, approached the new arrivals (R. 202:52). 
Contreras got back into Rivas's car (R. 202:53). 
A short while later, one of the males from the Ford Thunderbird opened 
Contreras's door and told Contreras to get out (R. 202: 15, 53). Contreras complied (R. 
202:15, 53). Then, defendant and the rest of the males from the Thunderbird surrounded 
Contreras and moved him toward a tree near the front of the house (R. 202:15-16, 53). 
There, defendant drew a gun, pointed it at Contreras's head, and pushed him into the tree 
(R. 202:15-16). Defendant then put the gun to Contreras's head and took Contreras's 
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rings, necklace, and wallet. (R. 202: 16-17). One of defendant's friends punched 
Contreras in the face, telling him not to squeal or they would "do something to [him]" (R. 
202: 16). 
Immediately after the robbery, Sandra Cortez came out of her house, told 
defendant and his friends to leave, and told Contreras to come inside (R. 202:16). 
Defendant and his friends left (R. 202:22). 
Defendant was apprehended three months later during a traffic stop in which he 
gave the investigating officer a false name (R. 202:75-76). At the time, defendant was 
wearing Contreras's necklace and one of his rings (R. 202:16-20, 75-76). 
The Plea Discussion. At a pre-trial conference on December 13, 2002, the 
prosecutor and defense counsel presented the trial court with a plea agreement amending 
the information to a third degree felony in exchange for a guilty plea (R. 200: 3-4 (copy of 
transcript of pre-trial conference attached at Addendum C)). 
Upon questioning from the court, the prosecutor indicated that "there are some 
facts that are—make the story not as presentable to the jury and I would rather accept 
the—the lesser plea than run the risk of (inaudible)" (R. 200:4). 
In response, the trial court noted that defendant had been originally charged with 
aggravated robbery and that the information alleged "that the defendant used a firearm, 
which would enhance that, and also that he committed a crime with four other persons, 
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which would enhance that again" (R. 200:4). Yet, the court noted, "the State wants to 
drop this down to a third-degree felony?" (R. 200:4).1 
The court then indicated that "I don't waive firearms enhancements, folks[,]... 
unless I'm convinced that there was some mistake in pleading" (R. 200:4). Here, the 
court noted, the "probable cause statement says that Mr. Montiel produced a gun and held 
it to the victim's head . . . while he was being robbed by the rest of them" (R. 200:4). 
When defense counsel stated, "there's also the additional reason . . . in terms of 
judicial economy," the trial court responded: "I don't care about judicial economy when 
people are alleged to have used firearms in the commission of a crime" (R. 200:4-5). 
Thus, the court continued, "I'm not going to waive the firearms enhancement [u]nless you 
Consistent with the parties' representations, the court of appeals indicated that 
"use of a firearm is an element of aggravated robbery rather than an enhancement," 
Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, Tf 4 n.l, suggesting that the trial court mis-spoke when it 
identified use of a firearm as an enhancement. However, under Utah law, the trial court's 
description of the charges as including a gun enhancement in addition to the aggravated 
robbery charge was accurate. 
Under Utah law, a defendant may be charged with and sentenced on both a crime 
involving the use of a weapon and an enhancement based on the use of that weapon. See 
State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 995 (Utah 1978); State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 192 (Utah 
1988); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 85-87 (Utah App. 1990). Moreover, a prosecutor is 
not required to separately charge a dangerous weapons enhancement if use of the weapon 
is also an element of the crime. See Speer, 750 P.2d at 192 (stating "adequate notice [of 
firearms enhancement] is given if the information alleges either that the enhancement 
statute may apply or that a firearm was used in the commission of the offense") (citing 
Angus, 581 P.2d at 995) (emphasis in original); see also State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, \ 11-
12, 980 P.2d 191 (citing Angus with approval) 
Thus, although use of a firearm is, as the court of appeals noted, an element of 
aggravated robbery, Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, |^ 4 n.l, alleging its use in the 
information is also sufficient to plead a firearms enhancement. 
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can tell me you don't have any evidence that he [had] a firearm or there wasn't a firearm 
or your witness is lying" (R. 200:5). 
At that point, the prosecutor explained that the evidence concerning the gun "is the 
story that is told by the—by the complaining witness" (R. 200:5). When the court noted 
that the facts alleged in the information indicated that "[a] bunch of guys jumped this guy 
walking down the road and put a gun to his head," the prosecutor agreed with the court 
that, if true, "it's a serious crime" (R. 200:5). However, the prosecutor argued, 
"sometimes it's better to have the—the verdict in hand than—than two in the bush" (R. 
200:5). 
The prosecutor continued, "I think this person is a dangerous person. My objective 
. . . and my duties to the taxpayers . . . is to take this person, who I believe to be a 
dangerous person, and lock him up" (R. 200:5-6). When the court responded, "Lock him 
up for zero to five, what kind of a deal is that?" the prosecutor noted, "It's better than 
zero to zero, your Honor" (R. 200:6). 
After confirming with the prosecutor that the prosecutor had discussed the plea 
with his supervisor, the court asked, "What does the victim say about this?" (R. 200:6). 
The prosecutor stated, "I have not talked to the victim about this particular one, although 
I've talked to the victim previously about offering a second (inaudible)" (R. 200:6). 
The court, after noting a supreme court case in which the court "accused the 
District Attorney's office and the trial judge of running rampant over victim's rights by 
not telling them what's going on," stated, "We haven't even told—we haven't even told 
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the person who claims all these things occurred as to what are you going to do. I think 
he's entitled to know" (R. 200:6-7). 
The court then concluded: "I'm not going to allow the filing of this amended 
information at this point and I'm not going to accept any plea to a third-degree felony on 
the basis of what I've heard" (R. 200:7). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's 
rejection of the plea agreement. Defendant argues that "the trial court's stated policy of 
refusing to allow plea reductions in cases involving firearms constituted a refusal to 
properly exercise its discretion in assessing the appropriateness of the plea agreement." 
Defendant asserts that "the trial court's fixed policy . . . permitted the trial court to: 
(A) reject the plea agreement without considering all legally relevant factors, (B) exceed 
the scope of its authority, and (C) use arbitrary judgment." This Court should reject 
defendant's claim. 
First, as the court of appeals concluded, the trial court did not rely solely on any 
firearms enhancement policy in rejecting the plea agreement. Rather, the trial court also 
considered the alleged facts of the crime, the lenient sentence defendant would receive 
under the plea agreement, and the prosecutor's admission that he had not discussed the 
plea with the victim. Because defendant did not challenge any of these other legitimate 
bases for the trial court's ruling, the court of appeals properly rejected defendant's claim. 
Second, even assuming the trial court's ruling was based on a fixed policy 
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concerning gun enhancements, defendant did not raise any of the arguments he now 
makes below. Thus, his claims are unpreserved and will be considered by this Court only 
if defendant argues plain error. Because defendant has not argued plain error, this Court 
should not consider his claims. 
Third, even on their merits, defendant's unpreserved claims fail because he cannot 
establish plain error in the trial court's policy. As an initial matter, the record does not 
support defendant's claim that the trial court had a "fixed policy" of "[not] allowing] 
plea reductions in cases involving firearms." Rather, the record only suggests that, where 
the evidence supports a charged firearms enhancement, the court would not accept plea 
agreements that waived firearms enhancements. Presumably, the court would consider 
plea agreements that involved reduced charges but retained firearms enhancements. 
Because Utah has no case law defining the trial court's policy as an abuse of 
discretion, defendant attempts to rely on foreign jurisdictions to make that showing. 
However, foreign jurisdictions vary greatly in the discretion they grant trial courts in 
rejecting plea agreements. Under such circumstances, defendant cannot show that the 
trial court's policy, even if erroneous, was obviously so. 
Finally, even if defendant could show obvious error in the trial court's policy, he 
has not shown that he was prejudiced by that error. Under Utah law, a defendant is 
prejudiced by the trial court's rejection of a plea agreement only if he can establish that he 
took action in reasonable reliance on the plea agreement that would substantially affect 
his trial. Defendant has made no such showing here. 
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ARGUMENT 
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT HAD MULTIPLE GROUNDS FOR 
REJECTING THE PLEA AGREEMENT, THE COURT OF 
APPEALS PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
CHALLENGING ONLY ONE OF THOSE GROUNDS 
On certiorari, defendant claims that the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial 
court's rejection of the plea agreement. See Pet. Br. at 10. Defendant claims that, 
because the trial court rejected the agreement based solely on its policy not to waive gun 
enhancements, the court of appeals erred in upholding that rejection. See Pet. Br. at 10. 
Defendant's claim fails because it is not supported by the record. It also fails on its 
merits, because defendant has not demonstrated plain error. 
A. The court of appeals properly upheld the trial court's rejection of the 
plea agreement because defendant challenged only one of the grounds 
upon which the trial court's ruling was based. 
Before the court of appeals, defendant claimed that the trial court improperly 
rejected the plea agreement based solely on a fixed policy of not waiving gun 
enhancements. See Aplt. Br. at 11, 16, 22. The court of appeals rejected defendant's 
claim, holding that because the trial court "had additional grounds for rejecting the plea 
agreement," the trial court did not abuse its discretion. State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 
242, \ 19, 95 P.3d 1216. On certiorari, defendant asserts that the court of appeals erred 
because "[t]he trial court . . . made clear it was rejecting the plea agreement based entirely 
on its stated policy to never 'waive firearms enhancements.'" Pet. Br. at 16 (emphasis 
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added). Because the record does not support defendant's claim, but rather supports the 
court of appeals' holding, this Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision. 
As this Court has held, an appellant challenging a trial court's ruling must 
challenge all the alternative bases of that ruling. Thus, for example, in State v. Love 11, 
758 P.2d 909, 910 (Utah 1988), the defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault 
and aggravated kidnapping. On appeal, Lovell claimed that the trial court abused its 
discretion "in imposing concurrent fifteen-year prison sentences." Id at 912. In rejecting 
LovelPs claim, this Court noted that the trial court "based its decision to impose the 
maximum fifteen-year sentences on two aggravating circumstances" and that the 
defendant's challenge "focuse[d] only" upon one. Id. at 912-13. This Court held that, 
"[s]ince we conclude that either of the aggravating circumstances was sufficient to 
support the sentences imposed, we need not consider this point further." Id. at 913; see 
also State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993) (holding that trial court's reliance 
on improper aggravating factor was harmless where additional aggravating factors 
supported sentence); State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) (same); State v. 
Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 810 (Utah App. 1998) (same); and see also State v. Loose, 2000 UT 
11, Tf 10, 994 P.2d 1237 (rejecting defendant's claim that evidence was inadmissible 
under a statutory provision where evidence was admissible on another basis); Julian v. 
State, 966 P.2d 249, 256 (Utah 1998) (holding habeas court erred in setting aside 
convictions based on error in admitting hearsay statements under statute where statements 
were otherwise admissible under rules of evidence). 
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Several courts have applied this same rationale in reviewing a trial court's 
rejection of a plea agreement. See United States v. Gamboa, 166 F.3d 1327, 1331 n.4 
(11th Cir. 1999) ("Because the court had other sound bases for rejecting the tendered 
pleas , . . . we need not address the question whether the court was correct in concluding 
that the tendered pleas lacked a factual basis."); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 
1439 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that where district court's rejection of plea agreement "was 
based, in part, on reasons that constitute the sound exercise of judicial discretion," fact 
that court also relied on improper basis did not warrant reversal); State v. Southworth, 52 
P.3d 987, 997 (N.M. Ct. App.) (holding "we need not determine whether a trial court 
would abuse its discretion if it rejected a plea merely because the plea was entered after 
the expiration of a court-imposed deadline" where "the record shows that the court 
rejected the plea for a number of other reasons"), cert, denied, 52 P.3d 411 (N.M. 2002). 
In this case, defendant's challenge to the trial court's rejection of the plea 
agreement rests solely on his claim that the court's ruling was "based entirely on its stated 
policy to never 'waive firearms enhancements' and nothing the parties said or did would 
induce the trial court to deviate from its stated policy." Pet. Br. at 16 (emphasis added). 
Thus, according to defendant, although the trial court addressed judicial economy and 
"made passing references about the sentence and the victim,... these . . . were only in 
response to the parties' persistence." Pet. Br. at 16. Defendant contends that the trial 
court "did not actually consider these factors when rejecting the plea agreement." Pet. Br. 
at 17. The record belies defendant's contentions. 
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When presented with the plea agreement, the trial court first asked the prosecutor 
to explain the basis for the agreement (R. 200:4). The prosecutor indicated that "there are 
some facts that are—make the story not as presentable to the jury and I would rather 
accept the—the lesser plea than run the risk of (inaudible)" (R. 200:4). 
In response, the trial court noted that defendant had been originally charged with 
aggravated robbery and that the information alleged "that the defendant used a firearm, 
which would enhance that, and also that he committed a crime with four other persons, 
which would enhance that again" (R. 200:4). Yet, "the State wants to drop this down to a 
third-degree felony?" (R. 200:4). 
The court then stated, "I don't waive firearms enhancements, folks[,] . . . unless 
I'm convinced that there was some mistake in pleading" (R. 200:4). Here, the court 
noted, the "probable cause statement says that Mr. Montiel produced a gun and held it to 
the victim's head . . . while he was being robbed by the rest of them" (R. 200:4). 
When defense counsel stated, "there's also the additional reason . . . in terms of 
judicial economy," the trial court responded: "I don't care about judicial economy when 
people are alleged to have used firearms in the commission of a crime" (R. 200:4-5). 
"I'm not going to waive the firearms enhancement [u]nless you can tell me you don't 
have any evidence that he [had] a firearm or there wasn't a firearm or your witness is 
lying" (R. 200:5). 
At that point, if the trial court truly had a "fixed" policy of not waiving gun 
enhancements, one would have expected the court to reject the plea agreement out of 
13 
hand as not meeting the court's exceptions to that fixed policy. Instead, however, the trial 
court continued discussing the propriety of the plea agreement, addressing not only the 
circumstances of the crime as alleged in the information, but the relationship between the 
alleged crime and the penalty provided under the plea agreement, and whether the victim 
was aware of the agreement. 
Thus, contrary to defendant's suggestion that the trial court never considered "the 
facts alleged by the State," Pet. Br. at 17, the court referred for a third time to the facts 
alleged in the information—i.e., that "[a] bunch of guys jumped this guy walking down 
the road and put a gun to his head,"—noting that these facts alleged "a serious crime" (R. 
200:5). 
The court then listened as the prosecutor explained that "sometimes it's better to 
have the—the verdict in hand than—than two in the bush" (R, 200:5). And the court 
listened as the prosecutor said, "I think this person is a dangerous person. My objective . . 
. and my duties to the taxpayers . . . is to take this person, who I believe to be a dangerous 
person, and lock him up" (R. 200:5-6). 
And again, instead of merely re-iterating its policy, as one would expect if it were 
truly "fixed," the trial court asked, "Lock him up for zero to five, what kind of a deal is 
that?" (R. 200:6). At that point, clearly, the court was no longer concerned about the 
fact that the plea agreement did not include a firearms enhancement per se, but instead 
was concerned about the discrepancy between the alleged crime, the prosecutor's stated 
goal of ensuring that a dangerous man was incarcerated, and the fact that the sentence 
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allowed under the plea agreement did not actually guarantee such incarceration. Thus, 
contrary to defendant's contention that the court never did so, the trial court clearly 
considered "the appropriateness of the plea in light of public interest." Pet. Br. at 16. 
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court only "made passing references 
about. . . the victim . . . in response to the parties' persistence," Pet. Br. at 16; see also 
Pet. Br. at 17; and that "[w]hether the victim approved of the plea is not clear from the 
record" because "the trial court interrupted the prosecutor and prevented him from telling 
exactly what the victim felt and whether the victim approved of a plea akin to the current 
plea," Pet. Br. at 18. Neither of these contentions is borne out by the record. 
It was the court—not the parties—who raised the issue of the victim's awareness 
of the plea agreement (R. 200:6). In fact, the trial court sua sponte asked, "What does the 
victim say about this?" (R. 200:6). The prosecutor then responded, "I have not talked to 
the victim about this particular one, although I've talked to the victim previously about 
offering a second (inaudible)" (R. 200:6). Then, the prosecutor made no effort to correct 
the court when it concluded, "We haven't even told—we haven't even told the person 
who claims all these things occurred as to what are you going to do. I think he's entitled 
to know" (R. 200:6-7). 
Based on this record, the trial court clearly did not reject the plea agreement based 
solely on a fixed policy not to waive firearms enhances. Rather, the court was also 
concerned that the lenient sentence provided under the plea agreement was not 
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commensurate to either the charged crime or defendant's dangerousness, and also that the 
prosecutor had not informed the victim of the plea agreement. 
Certainly, under this Court's decision in State v. Casey, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in rejecting the plea agreement where the victim had not been 
consulted. See Casey, 2002 UT 29, ffif 26, 37 & n.l 1, 44 P.3d 756 (holding victim's 
"constitutional and statutory right to be heard upon request... include[s] the right to be 
heard upon request at defendant's change of plea hearing"; noting that, although not 
required before accepting or rejecting a plea agreement, informing a victim of the 
agreement is "sound judicial practice"); see also People v. Grove, 566 N.W.2d 547, 558 
(Mich. 1997) (holding trial court properly considered interests of victim in rejecting plea). 
Nor did the court abuse its discretion in rejecting the agreement because of the 
lenient sentence provided by it. Cf. State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13,116, 17 P.3d 
1153 (indicating that trial court could properly reject plea agreement that "failed to 
adequately address the issue of restitution"); State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Term. 
1995) (noting "one valid reason for rejecting a plea agreement is that the proposed 
sentence is considered too lenient under the circumstances"); Southworth, 52 P.3d at 997 
(same); United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. 
Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 696 (2nd Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Robertson, 
45 F.3d 1423, 1439 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 
1462 (10th Cir. 1985) (same, even where prosecutor voiced concern over difficulty of 
proving charged crimes and parties raised issue of judicial economy); United States v. 
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Miller, 722 F.2d 5625 563 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 
704 (5th Cir. 1977) (same). 
Under these circumstances, the court of appeals properly rejected defendant's 
claim challenging only the trial court's statements regarding firearms enhancements 
where defendant "did not address the trial court's other grounds for rejecting the plea 
agreement." Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, \2\;see also Loose, 2000 UT \\,\ 11; Julian, 
966 P.2d at 256; Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301; Russell, 791 P.2d at 192; Lovell, 758 P.2d at 
913; Baker, 963 P.2d at 810; Southworth, 52 P.3d at 997. 
B, Assuming arguendo that the trial court relied solely on a fixed policy 
not to waive gun enhancements, this Court should reject defendant's 
unpreserved claims challenging that policy because defendant has not 
argued plain error. 
Defendant claims that "the trial court's stated policy of refusing to allow plea 
reductions in cases involving firearms constituted a refusal to properly exercise its 
discretion in assessing the appropriateness of the plea agreement." Pet. Br. at 9-10. 
Defendant claims that the court's policy constitutes an abuse of discretion because it 
"permitted the trial court to: (A) reject the plea agreement without considering all legally 
relevant factors, (B) exceed the scope of its authority, and (C) use arbitrary judgment." 
Pet. Br. at 10. Assuming arguendo that the trial court's decision was based on a fixed 
policy concerning firearms enhancements, defendant's claims fail because he has not 
argued plain error. 
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The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal.'" State v. Johnson, 
174 P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, Tf 11, 10 P.3d 346. The objection at trial must "be specific enough to give the trial 
court notice of the very error . . . complained of," Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. v. Square 
D. Co., 669 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983), so that the court "might have an opportunity to 
correct [it] if [the court] deems it proper," Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. 
Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah 1974). This preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . 
unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' 
occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f^ 11 (citations omitted). If a defendant does not argue 
plain error or exceptional circumstances, this Court will decline to consider defendant's 
unpreserved claim. See State v. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, ^ j 5, 63 P.3d 66 ("Because 
defendant has not asserted either of the exceptions to the general [preservation] 
rule—plain error or exceptional circumstances—we decline to address defendant's 
constitutional issues."); State v. Bisner, 2002 UT 86, Iffl 70-71, 55 P.3d 573 (declining to 
reach unpreserved claim on appeal where defendant "has argued neither plain error nor 
exceptional circumstances"). 
In this case, the only claim defendant raised in the trial court was that the plea 
agreement was desirable for reasons of judicial economy (R. 200:4-5). Defendant never 
argued that the trial court's rejection of the plea agreement could not be based on a fixed 
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policy not to waive firearms enhancements. Consequently, defendant's claims are 
unpreserved, see Beehive MedicalElecs., Inc., 669 P.2d at 860, and this Court will not 
consider them for the first time on appeal unless defendant has argued plain error, 
Hodges, 2002 XJT 117,% 5. 
Before the court of appeals, defendant asserted that his claims were properly 
preserved but that, even if not preserved, "his conviction merits reversal regardless of 
preservation because the trial court's abuse of discretion was plain error." Aplt. Br. at 25 
(holding and capitalization omitted). Because the court of appeals decided defendant's 
appeal on alternative grounds, it never considered defendant's arguments on their merits. 
Nonetheless, it implicitly found those arguments unpreserved when it noted, "Our 
resolution makes it unnecessary to consider whether the trial court committed plain error 
in rejecting the plea agreement." Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, % 21 n.5. 
Before this Court, defendant has not argued that the trial court's ruling was plain 
error but rather only that it was an abuse of discretion. See Pet. Br. at 7-27. Under such 
circumstances, this Court should decline to consider defendant's unpreserved challenges 
to that ruling. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, If 5; Bisner, 2002 UT 86, ffif 70-71. 
C. Even if this Court reaches the merits of defendant's claims, they fail 
because defendant cannot show any consensus in the foreign case law 
upon which he relies; thus, he cannot show that the trial court's policy 
here constitutes obvious error. 
As previously stated, defendant claims that the court's policy of not waiving gun 
enhancements constitutes an abuse of discretion because it "permitted the trial court to: 
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(A) reject the plea agreement without considering all legally relevant factors, (B) exceed 
the scope of its authority, and (C) use arbitrary judgement." Pet. Br. at 10. Even if this 
Court reaches the merits of defendant's claims, they fail because he has not demonstrated 
plain error. 
1. General law regarding plea agreements, 
"Plea bargaining is an essential component of the criminal justice system." State v. 
Pearson, 818 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1991). Not only does such bargaining "lead[] to 
the prompt and . . . final disposition of most criminal cases," Santobello v. New York, 404 
U.S. 257, 261 (1971), but it may also "affordf] the prosecutor additional leverage in 
prosecuting other crimes, and allows defendants who acknowledge guilt to spare 
themselves and the public an expensive trial," State v. Eager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Iowa 
2001). Consequently, '"[p]roperly administered, [plea bargaining] is to be encouraged.'" 
Pearson, 818 P.2d at 582 (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260) (second alternation in 
original). 
However, "[a] criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the 
Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 
U.S. 25, 38 n.ll (1970); see also Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; Lynch v. Overholser, 369 
U.S. 705, 719 (1962). Indeed, "[a] plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional 
significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the 
judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally 
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protected interest." Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984); see also State v. 
Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, Tf 14, 17 P.3d 1153. 
Moreover, a criminal defendant has no right to a plea agreement under Utah law. 
Rather, "[t]he Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly provide that '[t]he court may 
refuse to accept a plea of guilty.'" State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah App. 
1998) (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)); see also State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah 
App. 1989) (same). "[E]ven where 'the government and the defendant reach a plea 
agreement, the court is not required to accept it.'" Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, f^ 14 
(citation omitted). 
Consequently, even though "disposition of criminal charges by agreement between 
the prosecutor and the accused . . . is an essential component of the administration of 
justice," "[a] court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion." Santobello, 
404 U.S. at 260, 262; see also Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, \ 14; Turner, 980 P.2d at 
1190; United States v. Torres -Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 695 (2nd Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 45 (2nd Cir. 1986). 
2. Clarification of the "fixed" policy at issue. 
Throughout his brief, defendant claims that this Court should reverse the court of 
appeals' decision because the trial court's rejection of the plea agreement was based 
solely on a "[fixed] policy of rejecting plea reductions in cases involving firearms." Pet. 
Br. at 27; see also Pet. Br. at 18 ("Indeed, it did not matter what plea agreement was 
reached or what circumstances necessitated the plea because the trial court's fixed policy 
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labeled as too lenient any plea reduction in a case involving a firearm"); Pet. Br. at 23 
("[The trial court] ruled no plea reduction would be accepted because it had a fixed policy 
to never 'waive firearms enhancements.'" (citation omitted)). 
Based on this characterization of the trial court's policy, defendant describes the 
inauspicious implications for fixture prosecutors and defendants unfortunate enough to 
have their criminal cases assigned to that court: "Because the trial court's policy is fixed, 
future prosecutors and defendants in cases involving firearms will similarly be denied the 
opportunity to enter plea agreements and be forced to take the case to trial." Pet. Br. at 
23; see also Pet. Br. at 26 ("[U]nder the trial court's arbitrary policy, the State is 
automatically denied the leverage to bargain whenever it alleges use of a firearm and is 
assigned to this trial judge. Similarly,... the defendant is automatically denied the 
opportunity to acknowledge guilt and spare himself and the public an expensive trial no 
matter how appropriate the proposed plea may be."); Pet. Br. at 27 ("[If this Court 
upholds the court of appeals' decision], all trial courts will be permitted to formulate 
fixed policies that automatically prevent case resolution through plea bargaining no 
matter how appropriate the proposed plea may be under the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case."). 
Defendant, however, misstates the trial court's policy. Even assuming arguendo 
that the trial court's statements reflect a "fixed" policy, that policy is not a rejection of all 
plea reductions in cases involving firearms enhancements. Rather, the trial court's stated 
policy is only that it "do[es not] waive firearms enhancements" where the evidence 
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otherwise supports them (R. 200:4; see also R. 200:5). Thus, even if the trial court's 
policy is a "fixed" one, as defendant contends, that policy allows plea agreements 
involving reduced charges. It merely requires that if the prosecutor and defendant reach a 
plea agreement in a case involving a firearms enhancement, the agreement must include a 
criminal consequence for the use of the firearm. 
3. Defendant cannot establish obvious error in the trial court's 
policy where no dispositive Utah case exists and there is no 
consensus among foreign jurisdictions on the issue. 
Defendant claims that "this Court should reverse Montiel" because the trial court's 
rejection of the plea agreement was an abuse of discretion in three ways. Pet. Br. at 18. 
First, defendant claims that "the trial court's stated policy of refusing [to waive gun 
enhancements] permitted the trial court to rule without considering all legally relevant 
factors." Pet. Br. at 18-19. Second, defendant claims that "the trial court's fixed policy 
constituted a refusal to abide by the limits of its authority." Pet. Br. at 21. Finally, 
defendant claims that, "[b]y selecting one specific circumstance at the expense of all other 
relevant circumstances to mechanically reject Montiel's plea, the trial court acted 
arbitrarily." Pet. Br. at 26. Defendant's claims fail because he cannot show plain error. 
To demonstrate plain error, defendant must show that (1) the trial court erred; 
(2) the error should have been obvious; and (3) the error was prejudicial. See State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
To establish that an error should have been obvious, defendant "must show that the 
law was clear at the time of trial." State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, \ 6, 18 P.3d 1123. 
23 
The law is not clear unless it "unambiguously defined what the . . . court was required to 
[do]." State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, f 25, 61 P.3d 1000; see also State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 
236, 239 (Utah App. 1997) (holding error is not obvious "where there is no settled 
appellate law to guide the trial court"). 
Although this Court has not yet so held, the court of appeals has held that the 
absence of Utah law on point does not necessarily defeat a claim of obvious error. See 
Ross, 951 P.2d at 239. However, if a defendant relies solely on case law from foreign 
jurisdictions, he must show a consensus among those jurisdictions that "unambiguously" 
defines the trial court's action as error. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, \ 25. He cannot show 
obvious error if "other jurisdictions have reached no consensus" on the issue. Ross, 951 
P.2d at239; see also Foote v. United States, 670 A.2d 366, 369 (D.C. App. 1996) 
(rejecting plain error claim where claim was not supported by court's precedent and "the 
courts of other jurisdictions are sharply divided on the question . . . . " ) . And, defendant 
cannot show obvious error unless he can show that the consensus reached is based on 
statutes or rules substantially similar to the applicable Utah statutes or rules. Cf. State v. 
Casey, 2003 UT 55, ^ f 30-32, 82 P.3d 1106 (rejecting claim based on case law from other 
jurisdictions where those jurisdictions' statutes were distinguishable from Utah's statute); 
State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, Tf 15, 63 P.3d 66 ("[W]e cannot rely on cases defendant 
cites from other jurisdictions to reach a conclusion contrary to the plain language of our 
own statutes."). 
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In this case, defendant acknowledges that "Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure grants trial courts discretion to reject plea agreements." Pet. Br. at 7 
(citing rule that trial court "may refuse to accept a plea of guilty"). He also acknowledges 
that "Utah case law has not yet clearly defined the exact parameters of a trial court's 
discretion to reject a plea agreement," and that Utah cases have upheld a trial court's 
ruling even where that ruling was based on a single factor. Pet. Br. at 9 n.2. Thus, 
defendant essentially acknowledges that Utah law does not establish obvious error in the 
trial court's ruling here. 
"Therefore," defendant "relies largely on case law from other jurisdictions." Pet. 
Br. at 9 n.2. However, defendant fails to indicate the specific rules governing plea 
agreements in those jurisdictions or whether they differ substantially from Utah's rule. In 
any case, he cannot demonstrate consensus among other jurisdictions that a policy such as 
the trial court's here is error. Thus, defendant cannot establish that the trial court's policy 
was obvious error. See Ross, 951 P.2d at 239. 
a. Legally relevant factors. 
Because no Utah case law defines the factors a trial court must consider before it 
may reject a plea agreement, defendant relies on a West Virginia case to assert that, at a 
minimum, "the court should determine, 'in light of the entire criminal event and given the 
defendant's prior criminal record[,] whether the plea bargain enables the court to dispose 
of the case in a manner commensurate with the seriousness of the criminal charges and 
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the character and background of the defendant.'" Pet. Br. at 7 n.2, 11-12 (quoting State v. 
Sears, 542 S.E.2d 863, 867 (W.Va. 2000)). 
However, defendant fails to demonstrate that the West Virginia rule represents 
anything close to a consensus among foreign jurisdictions. See Pet. Br. at 11-15; see also 
Ross, 951 P.3d at 239 (rejecting plain error claim based solely on case law from foreign 
jurisdictions where "other jurisdictions have reached no consensus" on the issue).2 
In fact, courts vary widely in the discretion they grant trial courts in this area. For 
example, in some jurisdictions, a trial court has no duty to consider plea agreements at all. 
See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 637 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) 
(holding "Rule 11 does not require district courts to either accept a guilty plea or delineate 
its reasons for rejecting it"); United States v. Jackson, 563 F.2d 1145, 1148 (4th Cir. 1997) 
("In our opinion each individual judge is free to decide whether, and to what degree, he 
will entertain plea bargains."); Wright & Miller, 1A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. 3d § 175.1 
(discussing federal rule governing pleas and noting that "legislative history makes it clear 
that each judge is free to decide for himself whether, and to what degree, be will entertain 
plea bargains"). 
2Indeed, West Virginia's rule implies that a trial court must in essence collect all 
the information that is usually not considered until sentencing—i.e., order a pre-sentence 
report—before it may properly reject a plea. Although the West Virginia rule recognizes 
such a procedure, nothing in Utah law recognizes, let alone requires, such a procedure. 
Compare W. Va. R. Crim. P. 11 (providing that, if a plea agreement involves dismissal of 
charges, agreement to a specific sentence, or agreement not to pursue additional charges, 
the trial court "may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the 
acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence 
report") with Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (containing no such provision). 
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In others, a court may reject a plea agreement without ever stating its reasons for 
doing so. See, e.g., United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 703 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding 
that, where Rule 11 provides "specific procedural requirements for entering guilty pleas, 
we find that the absence of any requirement that the court state its reasons for refusing a 
plea bargain indicates that no statement of reasons is necessary"); State v. DeClue, 805 
S.W.2d 253, 256 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) ("The trial court had no duty to state upon the 
record the reason for its rejection" of a plea agreement.). 
And, in still other jurisdictions, a court may reject a plea agreement based on fixed 
policies having nothing to do with the nature of the actual criminal case or plea agreement 
before it. See, e.g, United States v. Gamboa, 166 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(holding "courts may reject guilty pleas that are tendered after a deadline set by the 
court"); People v. Jasper, 17 P.3d 807, 814-16 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (affirming trial 
court's rejection of plea agreement based solely on fact that agreement was presented 
after deadline where parties presented no good cause for missing deadline); but see State 
v. Eager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Iowa 2001) (holding courts may not reject plea solely 
because of missed deadline; requiring trial court to provide additional reasons but noting 
"[t]hese additional reasons are broad and fall within the ambit of the court's power over 
the administration of justice"). 
Even in jurisdictions that impose greater limits on a trial court's discretion, no 
consensus appears concerning what factors that court must consider before rejecting a 
plea agreement. See, e.g., Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 696 (holding that "[a]mong the 
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reasons that may justify the exercise of discretion to reject a plea agreement is a concern 
that the resulting sentence would be too lenient"); United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 
563, 566 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that although trial court may reject bargain as "too 
lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest," court's decision must also show that it 
considered prosecutor's reasons for presenting plea offer); United States v. Greener, 979 
F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that court's decision is reviewed under 
"deferential" abuse of discretion standard "and we will not reverse . . . if any reasonable 
person could agree with the district court"); Severino, 800 F.2d at 45-46 (noting "Rule 11 
does not purport to establish criteria for the acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement" 
and holding only that "if the court has reasonable grounds for believing that acceptance of 
the plea would be contrary to the sound administration of justice, it may reject the plea"); 
United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1461-62 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting that "plea 
agreement procedure does not attempt to define criteria for the acceptance or rejection of 
a plea agreement" and that plea may be rejected if "the district court believes that the 
bargain is too lenient or otherwise not in the public interest") (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); Hockaday v. United States, 359 A.2d 146, 148 & n.4 (D.C. 
App. 1976) (holding that trial court's ruling must show that "its action was the result of 
an informed and reasoned exercise of discretion" and "where, as here, a disposition has 
been agreed upon by both the defendant and the government, the trial court must identify 
good reasons for a departure from following that course"); Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 
160, 165 (Ind. 1983) (not providing list of mandatory factors court must consider, but 
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merely noting that trial court considered evidence of crime, defendant's presentence 
report, feelings of victim's family, time spent by parties in arranging plea, and respect due 
criminal statutes); Stacks v. State, 372 N.E.2d 1201, 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (holding 
trial court "'bears an obligation to evaluate the circumstances of the case and determine 
the propriety of the particular bargain,'" but failing to provide any further guidance to 
trial courts concerning factors it should consider); State v. Clanton, 612 P.2d 662, 665-66 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1980) (not providing list of mandatory factors court must consider, but 
merely holding that decision to accept or reject plea is within sound judicial discretion of 
court and "will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is determined that no reasonable 
person could take the view adopted by the trial judge"); People v. Grove, 566 N.W.2d 
547, 558 (Mich. 1997) (affirming trial court's rejection of plea where trial court 
considered facts of crime, interest of victim, and hindrance on court's ability to impose 
appropriate sentence); State v. Brown, 689 N.W.2d 347, 352 (Neb. 2004) (holding "trial 
courts [have] wide discretion in rejecting plea agreements for substantive reasons"); 
Sparks v. State, 759 P.2d 180, 184-85 (Nev. 1988) (per curiam) (holding trial court must 
"consider seriously the proffered plea" but providing only the most general outline of 
factors court may consider in rejecting plea); State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 577-78 
(Term. 1995) (not providing list of mandatory factors court must consider, but merely 
noting what trial court considered, including victim's position and leniency of sentence 
under plea); State v. Reuschel, 312 A.2d 739, 743 (Vt. 1973) (not providing list of 
mandatory factors court must consider, but merely noting what trial court considered, 
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including defendant's vacillating statements regarding his guilt and evidence State would 
produce). 
Moreover, even when jurisdictions do identify certain factors, those courts almost 
universally allow one of those factors—whether the sentence provided under the 
agreement is too lenient—to dominate. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 
1423, 1439 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding "court's categorical refusal to accept pleas" that 
guarantee a particular sentence); United States v. Foy, 28 F.3d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1994) 
("A court may properly reject a plea agreement based on undue leniency."); Hines, 919 
S.W.2d at 578 (holding "valid reason for rejecting a plea agreement is that the proposed 
sentence is considered too lenient under the circumstances"); see also United States v. 
Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 2002); Gamboa, 166 F.3d at 1330-31; Torres-
Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 696; Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462; Miller, 722 F.2d at 563; Bean, 
564 F.2d at 704; Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 25 (Ky. 2004); State v Southworth, 
52 P.3d 987, 997 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert, denied, 52 P.3d 411 (N.M. 2002); State v. Hunt, 
485 A.2d 109, 112-13 (Vt. 1984); cf. Daniels, 453 N.E.2d at 165 (holding trial court did 
not abuse discretion in rejecting plea to original charge that removed consideration of 
death penally despite victim's support for plea, where trial court "was concerned with 
affording the proper credibility and respect to the death penalty statute as a law which had 
been passed by the General Assembly on behalf of all the citizens of the state").3 
3In a footnote, defendant notes that some federal courts, based on the federal rule 
governing pleas, distinguish between "sentence bargains," in which the prosecutor 
"offer[s] to recommend or agree to a particular sentence," and "charge bargains," in 
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In this case, even assuming that the trial court's stated policy was "fixed," the 
court's statements at the pre-trial conference—which emphasized the crime charged, the 
alleged facts underlying that crime, and the disparity between the crime charged and the 
sentence under the plea agreement (R. 200:passim)—clearly show that the court's policy 
was bedded in a concern that the sentence provided in the plea agreement be 
commensurate with the nature of the crime. 
Given that some jurisdictions give trial courts absolute discretion in determining 
whether to reject a plea agreement and that some jurisdictions give courts discretion to 
reject agreements based on blanket policies having nothing to do with the facts of the 
case, defendant cannot show any consensus among jurisdictions regarding what factors a 
trial court absolutely must consider before it rejects a plea agreement. Thus, defendant 
cannot show that the trial court's failure to consider any particular factor was obvious 
error. See Weeks, 2002 Utah 98, Tf 25 (holding error cannot be obvious where law did not 
"unambiguously define[] what the . . . court was required to [do]"); Garcia, 2001 UT App 
19, If 6 (holding error is obvious only if "law was clear at the time of trial."); Ross, 951 
which prosecutors "offer to drop or reduce some of the charges." See Pet. Br. at 15 n.3 
(citing Eager, 630 N.W.2d at 834, and Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1437). Based on these 
distinctions, these jurisdictions usually grant a trial court more discretion to reject 
sentencing bargains than to reject charge bargains. See Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1437-38. 
However, other federal courts shun the distinction, recognizing that "[w]here 
charges are dismissed as bargaining chips, the primary effect is to limit the judge's 
discretion over the duration of imprisonment," and "[t]hus, there is no reason to believe 
that district courts would look more favorably on charge bargain agreements than on 
agreements as to sentences." United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1033 (2d Cir. 
1991). 
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P.2d at 239 (holding that defendant establishes obvious error based on foreign case law 
only if he can establish a consensus in that case law). 
Consequently, defendant's plain error claim that the trial court failed to consider 
all legally relevant factors fails. 
b. Scope of authority. 
Alternatively, defendant appears to raise a constitutional separation of powers 
claim, arguing that "the trial court's fixed policy constituted a refusal to abide by the 
limits of its authority" and "allowed the trial court to exceed the scope of its authority." 
Pet. Br. at 21, 24. Again, defendant's unpreserved claim fails. 
As with his previous claim, defendant cites no controlling Utah law to support his 
claim. See Pet. Br. at 19-24. Thus, he relies on selected cases from other jurisdictions 
that require acceptance of plea agreements unless the trial court finds an abuse of 
prosecutorial discretion. See Pet. Br. at 19-24 (citing United States v. Hockaday, 359 
A.2d 146, 148 (D.C. 1976); Sandy v. Fifth Judicial District Court, 935 P.2d 1148, 1151 
(Nev. 1997); United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Sparks v. 
State, 759 P.2d 180, 185 (Nev. 1988)). However, the rule adopted in defendant's cases 
has been expressly rejected by numerous other courts. Thus, again, defendant cannot 
establish obvious error in the trial court's actions here. 
Courts generally agree that "[t]he decision to indict, allege specific charges, or 
dismiss charges is inherently an exercise of executive power, and the prosecutor has 
broad discretion in these matters." United States v. Martin, 287 F.3d 609, 623 (7th Cir.), 
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cert, denied sub now. Alicea v. United States, 537 U.S. 884 (2002); see also United States 
v. Arenas-Ortiz, 339 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 540 U.S. 1084 (2003); 
United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 532 U.S. 1019 
(2001). 
Courts, however, diverge sharply on the respective roles of prosecutor and judge 
once initial charges have been filed. Most of defendant's cases suggest that once a 
prosecutor enters into a plea agreement, the trial court has no discretion to reject it unless 
the court "'can say that the action of the prosecuting attorney is such a departure from 
sound prosecutorial principle as to mark it an abuse of prosecutorial discretion.'" Pet. Br. 
at 20 (quoting Sparks, 759 P.2d at 185); see also Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 621; Hockaday, 
359 A.2d at 148; Sandy, 935 P.2d at 1151. 
Many courts, however, reject that view. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, for example, has found "unacceptable the . . . standard that a court must 
accept the plea unless the bargain is 'such a departure from sound prosecutorial principle 
as to mark it an abuse of prosecutorial discretion,'" noting that, "[t]o our knowledge no 
other circuit has followed the District of Columbia in so drastically limiting the discretion 
of a judge in regard to plea bargains." Bean, 564 F.2d at 703 n.4; see also Moore, 637 
F.2d at 1196 n.4 ("The precedential value of Ammidown has been considerably 
diminished since the adoption of the 1974 amendments to Rule 11 that were intended to 
increase the discretionary authority of the district court in dealing with guilty pleas."); 
Brown, 689 N.W.2d at 351 ("specifically declin[ing]" to endorse Ammidown's attempt "to 
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define the scope of a judge's discretion to reject a guilty plea"); State v. Daniels, 648 
A.2d 266, 268 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (rejecting rule that plea agreement can 
only be rejected if it "'constitutes an abuse of prosecutorial discretion'"; noting 
Ammidown has been superseded by amendment to Rule 11 "and by subsequent federal 
cases which enhance the discretionary authority of the district courts in dealing with 
guilty pleas.") (citation omitted).4 
Under these latter cases, after the prosecutor decides what charges to file, "the 
court has a role to play in plea bargains." Martin, 287 F.3d at 623. Thus, "[although a 
prosecutor may have wide discretion in initiating prosecutions, once the aid of the court 
has been invoked the court cannot be expected to accept without question the prosecutor's 
view of the public good." Bean, 564 F.2d at 703 n.4. Rather, once charges are filed, 
"[t]he [government's authority in choosing what offenses a defendant will face is 
tempered by the role of the district court in accepting or rejecting plea agreements." 
Jeter, 315 F.3d at 447. Cf. Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1465 (holding order denying plea 
agreement under Rule 11(e) "does not present the same constitutional difficulties as one 
denying" the State's motion to totally dismiss charges). 
The reason is because "[pjlea bargains . . . go to the traditionally judicial function 
of determining what penalty to impose." United States v. Escobar Noble, 653 F.2d 34, 37 
4Although Sandy v. Fifth Judicial District Court, 935 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Nev. 
1997), a case cited by defendant, does not expressly rely on Ammidown, Sandy relies on 
Sparks v. State, 759 P.2d 180 (Nev. 1988) (per curiam), which does expressly rely on 
Ammidown. See Sparks, 759 P.2d at 184-85. Thus, the Nevada cases cited by defendant 
are subject to the same criticism directed at Ammidown. 
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(1st Cir. 1981); see also Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 697 (holding that plea agreements 
"implicate[]d core judicial functions"). The discretion to reject pleas "protects against 
erosion of the judicial sentencing power." United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th 
Cir. 1993). Therefore, even where the plea agreement does not involve dismissal of other 
counts but only a "propos[al] to plead to a lesser offense than the one for which 
[defendant] was indicted, the district court [nonetheless] possess[es] broad latitude to 
evaluate the proposed plea." Torres-Echavarria, Y19 F.3d at 697; see also Jeter, 315 
F.3d at 447 (rejecting defendant's claim that trial court "abused its discretion when it 
rejected the initial plea agreement by usurping the Government's exclusive authority to 
determine when a prosecution should be terminated"). 
Consequently, although some courts have stated that trial courts should "hesita[te] 
before second-guessing prosecutorial choices" concerning a plea agreement, these same 
courts recognize that the trial court may reject the agreement if the court believes the 
defendant would receive too light a sentence under it. Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1439; Miller, 
722 F.2d at 563; see also Jeter, 315 F.3d at 447; Martin, 287 F.3d at 624. Cf. Escobar 
Noble, 653 F.2d at 37. 
In this case, the trial court's policy, even if fixed, clearly concerned "the 
traditionally judicial function of determining what penalty to impose." Escobar Noble, 
653 F.2d at 37; see also Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 697. Given that most 
jurisdictions grant trial courts discretion to reject agreements when the sentence is not 
commensurate to the crime, and that the trial court's policy is consistent with that 
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discretion, defendant has not shown that the trial court obviously exceeded its authority in 
applying its policy here. 
Thus, defendant's plain error claim that the trial court exceeded its authority in 
rejecting the plea agreement also fails. 
c. Arbitrariness,. 
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court "acted arbitrarily" in rejecting the plea 
agreement because "it ignored every circumstance except for its own personal bias 
against firearms." Pet. Br. at 25. Again, defendant has not established obvious error. 
As discussed above, trial courts generally have broad discretion in deciding 
whether to accept or reject plea agreements. See pp. 26-30 supra (citing, inter alia, 
Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 696; Miller, 722 F.2d at 563, 566; Greener, 979 F.2d at 
519; Severino, 800 F.2d at 45-46; Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1461-62; Moore, 637 F.2d at 
1196; Bean, 564 F.2d at 703 n.3; Jackson, 563 F.2d at 1148; Jasper, 17 P.3d at 814-16; 
Hockaday, 359 A.2d at 148 & n.4; Daniels, 453 N.E.2d at 165; Stacks, 372 N.E.2d at 
1207; Hager, 630 N.W.2d at 837; Clanton, 612 P.2d at 665-66; Grove, 566 N.W.2d at 
558; DeClue, 805 S.W.2d at 256; Brown, 689 N.W.2d at 352; Hines, 919 S.W.2d at 577-
78; Reuschel, 312 A.2d at 743; Wright & Miller, 1A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. 3d § 
175.1). 
Moreover, appellate courts generally uphold a court's decision to reject a plea 
based on a conclusion that the sentence under the agreement is too lenient. See pp. 30-31 
supra (citing Jeter, 315 F.3d at 447; Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 696; Robertson, 45 
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F.3d at 1439; Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462; Miller, 722 F.2d at 563; Bean, 564 F.2d at 704; 
Hines, 919 S.W.2d at 578; Southworth, 52 P.3d at 997. 
And at least one appellate court has recognized a trial court's discretion to 
consider, in determining whether to reject a plea, the legislature's intent behind the 
sentences imposed for the charged crime in making that determination. See p. 31 supra 
(citing Daniels, 453 N.E.2d at 165 (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in 
rejecting plea to original charge that removed consideration of death penalty despite 
victim's support for plea, where court "was concerned with affording the proper 
credibility and respect to the death penalty statute as a law which had been passed by the 
General Assembly on behalf of all the citizens of the state"). 
In this case, the trial court's policy was not, as defendant contends, "to never 
waive firearms enhancements." Pet. Br. at 25. Rather, the court clearly allowed waiver 
of such enhancements if the prosecutor proffered that the enhancement was improperly 
charged or that the evidence is insufficient to support it (R. 200:5). That the court itself 
imposed limitations on its policy indicates that it did not apply its policy arbitrarily. 
Moreover, as discussed above, the court's policy related directly to the crime 
charged and whether the sentence allowed under the plea agreement was commensurate 
to that crime. In addition, the court's policy gave proper respect to the legislature's desire 
to more severely punish those who use dangerous weapons in crimes. See State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65, 87 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that legislature's enactment of firearms 
enhancement provision reflected determination that "their use was more deserving of 
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enhanced punishment"). Where appellate courts have upheld trial courts' rejection of 
plea agreements based on similar factors, defendant has not shown that the court's policy, 
even if fixed, is obviously arbitrary. 
Thus, defendant's final challenge to the trial court's ruling also fails. 
D. Even if defendant could establish obvious error, he has not shown 
prejudice. 
Even assuming defendant has established the first two prongs of the plain error 
test—i.e., that the trial court's ruling was error and that the error should have been 
obvious,—defendant's claim still fails because he has not established the final 
prong—i.e., that he was prejudiced by the court's ruling. 
Defendant's entire prejudice argument appears in the introductory section of his 
argument and consists of the following: 
[T]his Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision and 
withdraw Montiel's conviction so the trial court can properly 
consider the State's proposed plea agreement. See Hockaday v. 
United States, 359 A.2d 146, 149 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (remanding 
case where trial court abused discretion by rejecting plea agreement 
because, "[b]y proceeding to trial," defendant was "exposed to a 
greater possible punishment than that which could have resulted 
from his guilty pleas"); United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 555, 560 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (same). 
Pet. Br. at 10. Defendant's claim fails because he has used the wrong standard to 
measure prejudice under these circumstances. 
In Utah, a defendant is prejudiced by a trial court's improper rejection of a plea 
agreement only if he can show that he "took any action in reliance on the tentative plea 
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agreement" that "would substantially affect" his trial. State v. Stringharn, 2001 UT App 
13, f^ 15, 17 P.3d 1153 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
In this case, defendant does not claim that he took any action in reliance on his 
tentative plea agreement with the prosecutor, let alone that such action substantially 
affected his trial. Thus, even assuming that the trial court erred in rejecting the plea 
agreement, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by that error. 
Moreover, if, as defendant contends, the trial court rejected the plea agreement 
solely on its fixed policy not to waive firearms enhancements and, thus, "did not actually 
consider" any other ground but rather "ignored every [other] circumstance," Pet. Br. at 
25, the proper remedy is not to upset defendant's trial and then have the trial court revisit 
the plea agreement applying the proper discretion. Rather, the proper remedy is to first 
remand the matter to the trial court to determine whether it would have accepted the plea 
absent its policy and only if the court concludes that it would have, vacate defendant's 
conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Foy, 28 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 1994) (remanding to 
trial court for reconsideration of plea agreement; ordering that if court ultimately accepts 
agreement, court should vacate defendant's convictions); United States v. Moore, 916 
F.2d 1131,1136 (6th Cir. 1990) (remanding to trial court "so that the district judge can 
articulate his reasons for rejecting [defendant's] guilty plea"). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm the court of appeals' 
decision affirming defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED j ^ _ March 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK' 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Court of Appeals of Utah 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Alex MONTIEL, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 20030310-CA. 
July 15, 2004 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the 
Third Distiict Court, Salt Lake Department, 
Timothy R Hanson, J , of aggravated robbery 
Defendant appealed 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J , 
held that 
(1) defendant did not invite trial court's alleged 
error in rejecting his plea agreement by failing to 
object to trial court's rejection, 
(2) defendant failed to address on appeal trial 
court's alternative reasons for rejecting plea 
agreement, and thus defendant's claim that trial 
court abused its discretion when it rejected 
proposed plea agreement was not subject to review 
by Court of Appeals, and 
(3) trial court's reliance on alternate grounds of 
rejecting defendant's plea agreement did not 
constitute abuse of discretion 
Affirmed 
Orme, J , concurred in result only 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law €^>1031(4) 
110kl031(4) Most Cited Cases 
[1] Criminal Law €=>1149 
1 lOkl 149 Most Cited Cases 
Ordinarily, a trial court's acceptance or rejection of 
a guilty plea is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard, however, if the defendant did 
not preserve the issue, Court of Appeals does not 
review his claim unless he demonstrates plain error 
[2] Criminal Law €^>1137(2) 
Page 1 
1 lOkl 137(2) Most Cited Cases 
in 
Defendant did not invite trial court's alleged error in 
rejecting his plea agreement by failing to object to 
trial court's rejection, where State had not 
demonstrated that defense counsel's conduct 1 ed the 
trial court into rejecting the plea agreement, and 
State had not cited any authority that supported the 
proposition that failure to object to the rejection of 
a plea agreement constituted invited error 
[3] Criminal Law €^>l 137(2) 
I lOkl 137(2) Most Cited Cases 
"Invited error doctrine" provides that on appeal, a 
party cannot take advantage of an error committed 
at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error 
[4] Criminal Law €=>1134(3) 
II Okl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant failed to address on appeal trial court's 
alternative reasons for rejectmg plea agreement in 
which defendant agreed to plead guilty to 
aggravated robbery charge in return for State to 
reduce charge from first degree felony to third 
degree felony, and thus defendant's claim that trial 
court abused its discretion when it rejected 
proposed plea agreement was not subject to review 
by Court of Appeals 
[5] Criminal Law €^>273.1(2) 
110k273 1(2) Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's reliance on alternate grounds of 
rejecting defendant's plea agreement, which 
consisted of sentence under plea agreement being 
too lenient and failure to inform victim of plea 
agreement, did not constitute abuse of discretion, 
both grounds had been recognized by other 
jurisdictions as a proper basis to reject a plea 
agreement Rules Cnm Proc , Rule 11(e) 
[6] Criminal Law €=>1134(3) 
11 Okl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
When challenging a trial court's decision, a 
defendant must address all of the circumstances 
upon which the court's decision was based 
© 2005 Thomson/West No Claim to Orig U S Govt Works 
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*1217 Heidi Buchi and Lon Seppi, Salt Lake Legal 
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Mark L Shurtleff, Arty Gen, and Karen A 
Klucznik, Asst Arty Gen, Salt Lake C lty, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, ORME, and 
THORNE 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge 
**1 Defendant Alex Montiel appeals his 
conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, m violation of Utah Code Annotated section 
76-6-302 (Supp 2001), with an enhanced penalty 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 
76-3-203 1 (Supp 2001) Defendant argues that the 
trial court abused its discretion when it rejected a 
plea agreement entered into by Defendant and the 
State because the court (1) failed to consider all 
legally relevant factors, (2) exceeded the scope of 
its authority, and (3) rejected the plea agreement 
arbitrarily We affirm 
BACKGROUND 
**2 On May 14, 2002, Defendant was charged 
with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, m 
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-302 
(Supp 2001) The chaige included an enhancement, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 
76-3-203 1 (Supp 2001), because the offense was 
committed in concert with two or more persons 
**3 During Defendant's pretrial conference, the 
prosecutor informed the trial court that the State and 
Defendant had entered into a plea agreement Under 
the terms of the agreement, Defendant was willing 
to plead guilty m return for the State reducing the 
charge against him to a third degree felony The 
prosecutor explained to the trial court that the 
agreement had been reached because theie weie 
"some facts that [made] the story not as 
presentable to the jury and [he] would rather accept 
the lesser plea than run the risk of (maudibb)" 
**4 The trial court reacted to the proposed plea 
agreement by first noting that Defendant had been 
charged with a first-degree felony, which was 
Page 2 
enhanced because Defendant "used a firearm" 
[FN1] and "committed a *1218 crime with four 
other p eople " The court then stated, "I don't waive 
firearms enhancements, folks You plead them, 
they're stuck unless I'm convinced that there was 
some mistake m pleading " 
FN1 In fact, use of a firearm is an element 
of aggravated robbery rather than an 
enhancement See Utah Code Ann § 76-6-
302(l)(a) (Supp 2001) ("A person 
commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he (a) uses 
or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon ") 
**5 After defense counsel suggested that the trial 
court should accept the plea m the interests of 
judicial economy, the court responded as follows 
I don't care about judicial economy when people 
are alleged to have used firearms in the 
commission of a crime I'll take whatever time to 
resolve the issue properly 
I'm not going to waive the fuearms enhancement 
Unless you can tell me you don't have any 
evidence that [Defendant] didn't [sic] have a 
firearm or there wasn't a firearm or your witness 
is lying 
**6 Once again, the prosecutor attempted to 
explain to the trial court his leasons for entering 
into the plea agreement He noted that "sometimes 
it's better to have the verdict in hand than two 
in t he b ush" a nd "that t he j ury m ay j ust s ay, o h, t o 
heck with this and lose it" The prosecutor also 
noted that he thought Defendant was a dangerous 
person and that his duty to the taxpayers of the state 
was to ensure that Defendant was locked up When 
the trial court questioned the wisdom of only 
incarcerating Defendant for zero to five years, [FN2] 
the prosecutor replied that it was "better than zero 
to zero " 
FN2 The maximum sentence for a third 
degree felony is a prison term of five 
years See Utah Code Ann § 76-3-203(3) 
(Supp 2001) 
**7 The trial court then turned its attention to the 
victim and asked the prosecutor if he had informed 
the victim of the plea agreement When the 
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(Cite as: 95 P.3d 1216, 2004 UT App 242) 
prosecutor said he had not, the court said that the 
victim was entitled to know The court then 
concluded that it was "not going to allow the filing 
of [the] amended information" and was "not going 
to accept any plea to a third-degree felony " 
**8 Defendant was tried shortly thereafter and 
found guilty as charged The trial court sentenced 
Defendant to a prison term of ten years to life 
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
**9 Defendant aigues that the court abused its 
discretion when it rejected the plea agreement 
entered into by Defendant and the State Defendant 
further argues that even if this court determines that 
he failed to preserve his claim for appeal, his claim 
should nonetheless be reviewed for plain error 
[1] **10 Ordinarily, a trial court's acceptance or 
rejection of a guilty plea is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard See State v Turner, 980 
P2d 1188, 1189-90 (Utah Ct App 1998) However, 
if Defendant did not preserve the issue, we do not 
review his claim unless he demonsuates plain error 
See State v Irwin, 924 P 2d 5, 7 (Utah 
Ct App 1996) (noting that appellate court may 
address an issue for the first time on appeal if trial 
court committed plain error) 
ANALYSIS 
**11 Defendant argues that the trial court erred 
when 11 r ejected t he p lea a greement e ntered l nto b y 
Defendant and the State because the court (1) failed 
to consider all legally relevant factors by summarily 
rejecting the plea agreement based on a fixed policy 
of refusing to waive firearms enhancements, (2) 
exceeded the scope of its authority by usurping the 
State's right to prosecute, and (3) rejected the plea 
agreement m an aibitrary manner The State 
responds by arguing that this court should not 
consider Defendant's claim because Defendant's 
repeated failure to object to the trial court's 
rejection of the plea agreement constituted invited 
error, and because Defendant failed to address on 
appeal all of the grounds upon which the trial court 
based its decision to reject the plea agreement The 
State further argues that even if this court addresses 
Defendant's claim, his claim fails because he cannot 
demonstrate that the trial court committed plain 
error when it rejected the plea agreement 
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*1219 **12 Before addressing Defendant's claim, 
we first consider the State's threshold arguments 
that Defendant invited the errors of which he now 
complains and that he failed to address on appeal all 
the reasons that the court gave for rejecting the plea 
agreement 
I Invited Error 
[2] **13 The State argues that plain error review 
does not apply m this case because defense counsel 
"made a strategic decision not to revisit the trial 
court's plea ruling before trial on any of the bases 
[Defendant] now r aises or any other basis," thereby 
inviting the error of which Defendant now 
complains Accordmg to the State, defense counsel 
instead "tookher chances and asked for an outright 
dismissal" upon learning that the State's mam 
witnesses had failed to show up on the first day of 
trial 
[3] **14 The invited error doctrine provides that 
"on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial 
court into committing the error" State v Dunn, 
850 P2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (footnote 
omitted) Here, the State has not demonstrated that 
defense counsel's conduct led the trial court into 
rejecting the plea agreement, particularly where it is 
clear from the record that Defendant was willing to 
accept the plea agreement Moreover, the State has 
not cited any authority that supports the proposition 
that failure to object to the rejection of a plea 
agreement constitutes invited error Finally, the 
State's suggestion that defense counsel's motion for 
dismissal is evidence of invited error also lacks 
merit It is well settled that defense counsel is 
obligated to move for dismissal when the State fails 
to produce sufficient evidence to prove the elements 
of the crime charged See, e g, State v Smith, 2003 
UT App 52,lfi| 32-33, 65 P 3d 648 Therefore, 
we reject the State's argument that Defendant 
invited the error he now asserts on appeal 
II Sufficiency of Defendant's Appeal 
[4] **15 The State also claims that the trial court's 
decision to reject the plea agreement rested on three 
grounds and only one of these grounds-that the 
underlying charge involved the use of a 
firearm--was challenged by Defendant on appeal 
Accordmg to the State, Defendant failed to address 
"the trial court's alternative grounds for rejecting the 
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plea agreement—that the minimal sentence was not 
commensurate to the charged crime or [DJeiendant's 
dangerousness and that the prosecutor had not 
informed the victim of the plea agrc ement" 
Therefore, the State argues that because all of the 
underlying reasons for the trial court's ruling were 
not a ddressed o n appeal, this c ourt s hould refuse to 
consider Defendant's claim 
**16 Defendant responds by arguing that the trial 
court's "alternative grounds for rejecting the plea" 
were actually "factors the trial court refused to 
consider under its fixed policy" According to 
Defendant, when the trial court rejected the plea 
agreement, it failed to consider whether Defendant's 
sentence was commensurate with the charged crime, 
and did not take into account the victim's input 
**17 Although not crystal clear, the record m this 
case is sufficient to support the State's argument that 
the trial court rejected the plea agreement, not only 
because the underlying charge involved the use of a 
firearm, but also because the court was concerned 
that Defendant would receive too lenient a sentence 
under the terms of the agreement and because the 
victim had not been informed of the agreement 
When the prosecutor indicated that the trial court 
should approve the plea agreement because 
Defendant was a dangerous person and should be 
locked up, the court responded by asking, "Lock 
him up for z ero to five, what k md o f deal I s that9" 
[FN3] This statement demonstrates that the trial 
court was concerned that "zero to five" was not an 
appropriate sentence in light of the nature of the 
alleged offense Accordingly, we conclude that one 
of the *1220 factors the trial court considered in 
rejecting the plea agreement was that Defendant's 
punishment under the plea agreement was not 
commensurate to the crime committed 
FN3 As noted earlier, "zero to five" refers 
to the number of years Defendant would 
have been incarcerated had the trial court 
accepted D efendant's plea to a third degree 
felony See Utah Code Ann § 76-3- 203(3) 
**18 The record also reveals that the trial court 
was concerned that the victim had not been 
informed of the plea agreement Prior to rejecting 
the plea agreement, the court specifically asked the 
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prosecutor what the victim thought of the 
agreement When the prosecutor replied that he had 
not talked to the victim about the agreement, the 
court reminded the prosecutor of a case where the 
trial judge had run "rampant over [the] victim's 
rights by not telling them what's going on" The 
court then made it clear that the victim was entitled 
to know about the plea agreement Therefore, 
based on these statements, we conclude that an 
additional reason the trial c ourt did not approve t he 
plea agreement was because the victim had not been 
informed of the agreement 
[5] **19 Having concluded that the trial court had 
additional grounds for rejecting the plea agreement, 
we also conclude that consideration of these 
alternate grounds did not constitute an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion [FN4] Several jurisdictions 
have held that a concern that a sentence under a 
plea agreement may be unduly lenient is not an 
improper basis for a trial court's decision to reject a 
plea agreement See, eg, United States v Bean, 
564 F2d 700, 704 (5th Cir 1977), People v Grove, 
455 Mich 439, 5 66 N W 2d 5 47, 558 (1997), State 
v Hines, 919 S W 2d 573, 578 (Tenn 1995) 
Moreover, at least one j unsdiction has noted that it 
was withm a trial court's discretion to reject a plea 
agreement on the b asis that the v ictim w as not told 
about the agreement See State v Boatfield, 2001 
WL 1635447 at * 8, 2001 Tenn Cnm App Lexis 
955, at *23 (Tenn Cnm App Dec 20, 2001) 
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it rejected the plea 
agreement b ased on concerns that Defendant would 
receive too lenient a sentence and that the victim 
had not been informed of the agreement 
FN4 The Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provide that a "court may refuse 
to accept a plea of guilty " Utah R Cnm 
P 11(e), see also State v Mane, 783 P 2d 
61, 66 (Utah Ct App 1989) (stating that 
"[n]othmg in the statute requires a court to 
accept a guilty plea") Moreover, this court 
has concluded that a trial court has the 
discretion to accept or reject a guilty plea 
See State v Turner, 980 P 2d 1188, 1190 
(Utah Ct App 1998) Therefore, a trial 
court's rejection of a plea agreement is 
properly reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard 
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However, we note that with respect to the 
acceptance or rejection of a plea 
agreement, our case law and rule 11(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
apparently conflict with rule 11(g)(1) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 11(g)(1) provides that "[i]f it appears 
that the prosecuting attorney or any other 
party has agreed to request or recommend 
the acceptance of a plea to a lesser 
included offense, or the dismissal of other 
charges, the agreement shall be approved 
by the court" Utah RCnm P 11(g)(1) 
(emphasis added) Therefore, it appears 
that under rule 11(g)(1), a trial court may 
not have the discretion to reject a plea 
agreement when that agreement is based 
on a prosecutorial decision to reduce the 
level of the charged offense or dismiss 
other charges However, the failure by 
either party to raise this issue on appeal 
precludes our consideration of it in this 
case 
[6] **20 When challenging a trial court's decision, 
we have made it clear that an appellant must 
address all of the circumstances upon which the 
court's decision was based See, e g, State v Baker, 
963 P 2d 801, 810 (Utah Ct App 1998) (refusing to 
consider propriety of trial court's sentencing 
decision because defendant challenged only two of 
four findings upon which the sentencing decision 
was based) Although Baker involved a challenge 
to a trial court's sentencing decision, the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals has applied the same 
rationale to a case involving a defendant's challenge 
to a rejected plea based on untimelmess See State 
v Southworth, 132 NM 615, 52 P 3d 987, 997 
(Ct App 2002) In declining to review the 
defendant's challenge, the Southworth court noted 
that the trial court "rejected the plea for a number of 
other reasons" and, therefore, it was unnecessary to 
determine whether the trial court abused its 
discretion by rejecting the plea "merely because the 
plea was entered after the expiration of a 
court-imposed deadline " Id 
**21 In this case, the only basis upon which 
Defendant challenged the trial court's rejection of 
the plea was that the court had a *1221 "fixed 
policy" of not waiving firearm enhancements He 
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did not address the trial court's other grounds for 
rejecting the plea agreement Because we have 
determined that these grounds are legitimate reasons 
for rejecting the plea agreement, we decline to 
further consider Defendant's challenge to the trial 
court's rejection of the plea agreement [FN5] 
Specifically, we do not address whether the trial 
couit's stated policy regarding charges involving use 
of a firearm, alone, would constitute an abuse of 
discretion in rejecting the plea agreement 
FN5 Our resolution makes it unnecessary 
to consider whether the trial court 
committed plain error m rejecting the plea 
agreement 
CONCLUSION 
**22 We reject the State's claim that Defendant's 
failure to object to the trial court's rejection of the 
plea agreement constituted invited error because it 
is clear from the record that Defendant was w llling 
to accept the plea agreement However, we 
conclude that Defendant addressed on appeal only 
one of the grounds upon which the trial court 
rejected the plea agreement and that the trial court's 
reliance on additional grounds for rejecting that 
agreement did not c onstitute an a buse o f d iscretion 
Accordingly, we decline to review Defendant's 
claim that the trial court abused it discretion when it 
rejected the proposed plea agreement 
**23 Affirmed 
**24 I CONCUR WILLIAM A THORNE JR, 
Judge 
**25 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT GREGORY 
K ORME, Judge 
95 P3d 1216, 504 Utah Adv Rep 4, 2004 UT 
App 242 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Addendum B 
Addendum B 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English 
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to 
the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
447 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 11 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence 
is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and 
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1,1996; November 1, 1997; Novem-
ber 1, 2001; November* 1, 2002.) 
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MS. BUCHI: Good morning, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
MS. BUCHI: Your Honor, if we could call Montiel, 
No. 21 on your calendar. 
THE COURT: We can. Let's wait a minute until my 
clerk gets back. 
MS. BUCHI: Okay. 
THE COURT: We're on No. 21, Alex Montiel. State of 
Utah vs. Alex Montiel, this is Case No. 02190655—or 6524. 
It's on for final pre-trial. We have a trial on next Monday, 
I believe. 
MS. BUCHI: It is, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Have we got Alex Montiel? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We do, but he says he's 
(inaudible) 
THE COURT: No. What he has to do is come out. 
MS. BUCHI: Your Honor, if I can approach. 
THE COURT: All right. You are Alex Montiel? 
MR. MONTIEL: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. I take it from what you've 
handed me, we're going to trial next Monday? 
MS. BUCHI: We are prepared to, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The State ready? 
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MR. BURMESTER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Counsel and the defendant here at 
9:00 o'clock. You'll have the appropriate attire for Mr. 
Montiel? 
MS. BUCHI: Yes, I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. I want everybody here at 9:30 
because I'll have the jury up here at 10:00 o'clock ready to 
go. 
I have the defendant's proposed instructions and 
proposed voir dire and if the State has any instructions, they 
can bring them first morning. 
Okay* Anything else we need to talk about in this 
case? 
MS. BUCHI: I don't believe so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: State have anything else? 
MR. BURMESTER: Nothing from the State, your Honor. 
THE COURT: See you at 9:30 on Monday. 
MS. BUCHI: Thank you, your Honor. That's all that 
I have. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Off the record. 
THE COURT: Ms. Buchi? 
MS. BUCHI: Good morning, your Honor. If we could 
return to the matter of Alex Montiel, we have a resolution. 
THE COURT: What's the plan here? 
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Give me the file back on Montiel, will you please, 
Evelyn? 
What's the reason we're doing this? 
MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, there are a couple of 
reasons. The first is, there are some facts that are—make 
the story not as presentable to the jury and I would rather 
accept the—the lesser plea than run the risk of (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Well, you—well, you've charged him with 
aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, and that—and the 
allegations, as I read the probable cause statement is that 
the defendant used a firearm, which would enhance that, and 
also that he committed a crime with four other persons, which 
would enhance that again. And—and the State wants to drop 
this down to a third-degree felony? 
Well, I don't waive firearms enhancements, folks. 
You plead them, they're stuck unless I'm convinced that there 
was some mistake in pleading. And this probable cause 
statement says that Mr. Montiel produced a gun and held it to 
the victim's head and while he was being—while he was being 
robbed by the rest of them. 
MS. BUCHI: Your Honor, there's also the additional 
reason that Mr. Montiel—Mr. Burmester and I have done prior 
to re-trial with Mr. Montiel, he was interested in knowing if 
there was any offer and I approached Mr. Burmester and we 
talked about it. I guess in terms of judicial economy as 
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well. 
THE COURT: I don't care about judicial economy when 
people are alleged to have used firearms in the commission of 
a crime. I'll take whatever time is necessary to resolve the 
issue properly. 
I'm not going to waiv6 the firearms enhancement. 
Unless you can tell me you don't have any evidence that he 
didn't have a firearm or there wasn't a firearm or your 
witness is lying. 
MR. BURMESTER: No, your Honor. It's just—just a 
matter of weighing—weighing the case. I mean, there are 
facts—that is the story that is told by the—by the 
complaining witness. 
THE COURTS And if it's true, it's a serious crime. 
MR. BURMESTER: Yeah. Absolutely. 
THE COURT: A bunch of guys jumped this guy walking 
down the road and put a gun to his head. 
MR. BURMESTER: Absolutely, your Honor, but there 
are also facts and as—as you're well aware with your many 
years of experience as a trial lawyer, sometimes it's better 
to have the—the verdict in hand than—than two in the bush. 
And there's sometimes that the jury may just say, oh, to heck 
with this and—and they lose it. 
I think this person is a dangerous person. My 
objective, I think, and my duties to the taxpayers of the 
5 
State is to take this person, who I believe to be a dangerous 
person, and lock him up. That is my objective and I think 
this is— 
THE COURT: Lock him up for zero to five, what kind 
of a deal is that? 
MR. BURMESTER: It's better than zero to zero, your 
Honor, and that's—that's just what I—where I'm at, I'm 
(inaudible) 
THE COURT: I assume you've run this by Mr. Yocom? 
MR. BURMESTER: I've run it by Mr. Morgan. 
THE COURT: Is he the one that does those things? 
MR. BURMESTER: Yes. There—there is a part 
committee, but in the event we have a short-term situation, 
then it's— 
THE COURT: What does the victim say about this? 
MR. BURMESTER: I have not talked to the victim 
about this particular one, although I've talked to the victim 
previously about offering a second (inaudible) 
THE COUET: Remember the case that Justice Wilkins 
wrote where he accused the District Attorney's office and the 
trial judge of running rampant over victim's rights by not 
telling them what's going on and that little fiasco out in 
Tooele? I don't think Mr. Yocom wants to have to undergo that 
again without at least an opportunity to look at this. I know 
I don't. And I'm not (inaudible). We haven't even told—we 
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1 haven't even told the person who claims all these things 
2 occurred as to what are you go^ng to do. I think he's 
3 entitled to know. 
4 | I'm not going to allow the filing of this amended 
5 Information at this point and I'm not going to accept any plea 
6 J to a third-degree felony on the basis of what I've heard. The 
7 case goes to trial Monday. 
8 MR. BURMESTER: Thank you, your Honor. 
9 MS. BUCHI: Thank you, your Honor. 
10 MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, I'm not sure if the 
11 Court cares, here's a witness list and I know the Court is 
12 concerned about that as alleged. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Very good. Thank you. 
14 MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, I just didn't—this case 
15 J is not the usual, so I did not prepared proposed voir dire. 
16 I—(inaudible) the Court stocks. 
17 THE COURT: I'm sure we can cover that. Thank you. 
18 MR. BURMESTER: Thank you. 
19 THE COURT: See you Monday. 
20 I (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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